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Article 6

The USCCB and Rape Protocols
by
Peter J. Cataldo, Ph.D.

The author is Director of Research, National Catholic Bioethics Center,
Boston, MA. Thefollowing is reprintedfrom Ethics & Medics, Volume 29,
No.4, April, 2004.

Mter a review of the moral and scientific literature, and a consultation with
physicians, theologians, and ethicists on the question of "emergency
contraception" in rape protocols, the United States Conference of Catholic
Bishops' Committee on Doctrine recently concluded in part that rape
treatment protocols that only provide pregnancy testing prior to
administering postcoital anovulatory drugs do not violate Directive 36 of
the Ethical and Religious Directives for Catholic Health Care Services. I
The central reason for this conclusion is that it is uncertain whether these
drugs in addition to suppressing ovulation might prevent pregnancy by a
prefertilization, contraceptive effect, or by a post-fertilization, abortifacient
effect. 2 I submit that the committee's reason and conclusion rest on two
erroneous assumptions. The first is that the purpose for testing the
woman's ovulation phase is to ascertain the possibility of oonception. 3 The
second assumption, related to the first and critical to the argument for
pregnancy-only testing, is that the prevention of fertilization includes
destruction of a bound oocyte and spermatozoon at any point prior to
formation of the zygote (prefertilization, contraceptive effect).4 These
assumptions are problematic and require examination in order to assess
whether ovulation phase testing is morally obligated according to Directive
36. The pertinent portion of Directive 36 for the issue oftesting as it relates
to the use of hormonal anovulatory drugs is the following:
A female who has been raped should be able to defend
herself against a potential conception from the sexual
assault. If, after appropriate testing, there is no evidence that
conception has occurred already, she may be treated with
medications that would prevent ovulation, sperm
capacitation, or fertilization.
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Pregnancy-Only Testing
Some advocates of pregnancy-only testing appear to misconstrue the
focus of the preventative measures mentioned in Directive 36 to be on
conception (formation of a zygote), both in terms of the purpose of
ovulation phase testing and the meaning of preventing fertilization . Two
inferences may be drawn if conception is the single standard by which
preventative measures are to be understood: a) ovulation phase testing is
interpreted as an ineffective attempt to determine possible conception,
because conception cannot be determined from that test; and b) actions that
intervene up to the point of conception are morally permissible. Knowing
whether an oocyte could be present at the time of administering the
medications has no moral relevance because, according to the pregnancyonly testing view, there is no demonstrable evidence that they cause an
abOltifacient effect; and, more importantly, these medications could
possibly act to prevent fertilization by "disrupting the fertilization
process."5 However, the purpose of ovulation phase testing is not to
determine a possible conception but to determine whether the drug is more
likely to suppress ovulation and thereby prevent an oocyte from being
available for fusion with a spermatozoon. In this way knowledge about the
suppression of ovulation is also directly related to any attempt to prevent
fertilization after ovulation.

Preventing Fertilization
Fertilization is inclusive of the many integral biological steps that
occur from the binding of an oocyte and a spermatozoon up to and
including the formation of a zygote. 6 Recent Catholic teaching recognizes
this scientific fact. 7 The fact that fertilization might not be complete until
the formation of a zygote should not be relevant to what Directive 36
counts as the prevention of fertilization. This completion point is not what
Directive 36 states may be prevented by medications in cases of rape. The
directive states that "she may be treated with medications that would
prevent ovulation, spenn capacitation, or fertilization ." It does not state
medications are permitted that prevent the "completion of fertilization after
the process has begun." To prevent fertilization is to prevent the process
from ever beginning, whether that process is defined as inclusive of, and
completed by, the formation of the zygote or not. 8 Thus, medications that
act on an oocyte and a spermatozoon bound or fused together up to the
moment of syngamy (fusion of the two pronuclei), would not count as
preventing fertilization but as interfereing with it and should not be allowed
according to Directive 36.
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Self-Defense and Ovulation Phase Testing
The intent of the statement in Directive 36 regarding preventative
medications is to allow only those medications that will prevent male and
female gametes from initially interacting as a matter of self-defense. This
includes 1) preventing the release of an oocyte, 2) preventing the ability of
spermatozoa from reaching an oocyte, and 3) preventing the binding of an
oocyte with a spermatozoon through either 1) or 2). These are all truly selfdefensive measures because they are aimed at thwarting the action of the
attacker's sperm as a lingering effect of the attack, not at destroying an
entity (the bound oocyte and spermatozoon) which exists independently
and is neither a cell of the attacker nor of the woman. By taking these
measures, the woman is defending her fertility, her oocyte, from being
joined with the attacker's germ cell. Consistent with self-defense, ovulation
phase testing helps to ensure actions that will suppress ovulation to prevent
the interaction of gametes, not to intervene after the fertilization process
has begun but has not yet resulted in a zygote. Directive 36 was in part
designed to allow morally certain self-defensive measures against the
unjust meeting of gametes, not to accommodate evety request for postcoital
hormonal drugs short of RU-486, as tragic as the circumstances may be. 9
Moral Certitude
Given that the self-defensive actions of using medications are aimed
at, and are morally justified on the basis of, preventing the gametes from
meeting, Directive 36 presumes that this result is known with a moral
certitude when the drugs are used. Moral certitude is the absence of
prudent fear of erring in a practical judgment that inchtdes indecisive
reasons contrary to the judgment. This is not absolute, one hundred percent
certitude, as may be possible in the natural or empirical sciences, and is not
required in matters of human action. However, to argue that this general
standard is alone sufficient for assessing the issue of postcoital hormonal
rape treatment, and that this standard is essentially different than some of
the casuist systems for determining moral certitude, is question-begging. 10
The general principle regarding certitude appropriate to the subject matter
is the conceptual justification for the use of moral certitude. The casuist
systems were applications of this general principle (albeit flawed in some
cases), and as such there is no essential difference between the two.
The Catholic moral tradition on moral certitude also required the
safer course of action in cases involving matters of great value such as
putting innocent human life at significant risk. It should be clear that this
requirement does not presume knowledge of actual human life at risk, but
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knowledge either of evidence pointing to a possible human being (e.g., the
hunter aiming at an object behind a bush) or of something that could harm
a human being actually known to exist (e.g., a person about to drink a
suspicious beverage). J J However, the safer-course requirement is not
applicable in the use of anovulatory hormonal agents because there is no
conclusive evidence pointing to the existence of a possible human
individual who might be harmed at the time that the drugs are given. This
fact does not help the pregnancy-only-testing position because, irrespective
of the lack of evidence for a human individual, destroying the bound
spermatozoon and oocyte prior to syngamy cannot count as prevention of
fertilization in the 20-30 percent of cases in which suppression of ovulation
might fail, and about which the actual mechanism of action is uncertain.
To conclude that administering only a pregnancy test does not violate
Directive 36 is to conclude that ovulation-phase testing is not obligated by
the directive. However, this second conclusion rests on the erroneous
assumption that preventing fertilization includes something other than
preventing the gametes from ever interacting as a matter of self-defense.
Based upon the foregoing argument, the conclusion of the Committee on
Doctrine should be reconsidered, and, it seems, a clarification of the text of
Directive 36 by the bishops would be warranted as well.
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